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PROPERTY LAW: Requirements for Certificates of Deposit and Bank
Accounts Held in Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship in
Indiana
INTRODUCTION
An increasingly popular device for the transfer of personal prop-
erty is the joint bank account with right of survivorship.1 The use
of survivorship accounts has precipitated considerable litigation due
to disapproval of joint tenancies generally, and the problems inher-
ent in establishing the donee-survivor's right to the property under
traditional theories of gift, trust or contract.2 Indiana permits the
transfer of personal property through the use of joint bank accounts,
but the decisions concerning such accounts reveal no single consis-
tent judicial standard.3 At the present time, persons establishing a
joint bank account with right of survivorship are not assured that
satisfaction of the statutory requirements and common bank prac-
tice will be sufficient to sustain the rights of the survivor should
there be a contest.
A recent decision of the Third District Court of Appeals of
Indiana illustrated the problems confronting a donee-survivor in
establishing his right to the res of a survivorship joint account fol-
lowing the death of the donor.4 In a two to one decision, the court
upheld the trial court's finding that four certificates of despoit made
payable to Eli F. Zehr, the depositor, or Donald E. Zehr, the appel-
lant, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, were assets of
the estate of the depositor, Eli F. Zehr. The case was tried on the
theory of an inter vivos gift, and the court held the gift invalid
because of a lack of delivery. The court relied on these facts: no
signature cards were executed; the funds deposited were the prop-
erty of the depositor; the appellant made no contribution; the de-
positor apparently maintained exclusive possession of the certifi-
cates in his lock box at the bank, to which only he had keys and
1. Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies, 54 MINN. L. REv. 509 (1970); Kepner,
Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 377 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Kepner, Joint
Bank Account Muddle]; Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, 41 CALIF. L.
REv. 596 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account).
2. See articles cited in note 1, supra; Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952) (court
applied Indiana law).
3. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972); Estate of Harvey v.
Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955); Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73
N.E.2d 181 (1947).
4. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -_, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972).
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which keys remained in his possession until his death; and during
the lifetime of the depositor the interest payments were paid di-
rectly to the depositor.5
The dissenter in Zehr believed that a narrow and illiberal con-
struction of the delivery requirement necessary to sustain a valid
inter vivos gift should not be used to thwart the clear intention of
the donor-depositor.' The dissenting judge felt that the signature
card argument was at best an artificial requirement' and that the
gift requirement of delivery should not be enforced arbitrarily to
defeat what the donor intended and deemed a sufficient delivery.8
Indiana case law was cited to support this position.'
The decision in Zehr v. Daykin illustrates the problems existing
in Indiana for the person who seeks to transfer property through a
joint bank account with right of survivorship. The purposes of this
comment are to consider the rights of a surviving tenant in light of
the existing statutes, to examine the basis for the decision in Zehr
and to attempt to reconcile the conflicting Indiana case law.'0
The Indiana Statute and the Court Required Gift, Trust or Contract
Indiana statute recognizes the creation of a joint tenancy in
personal property with right of survivorship. Indiana Code § 32-4-
1-1 reads:
Except as to obligations of the United States government,
held jointly or on which there appears the name of a surviv-
ing co-owner . . . the survivors of persons holding personal
property in joint tenancy shall have the same rights only as
the survivor of tenants in common, unless otherwise ex-
pressed in the instrument.
The courts have held that a survivorship right in a joint tenancy
must be expressly stipulated in the instrument creating the estate;"
5. Id. at -, 288 N.E.2d at 175.
6. Id. at -, 288 N.E.2d at 177.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see Ross, Executor v. Watkins, 80 Ind. App. 487, 141 N.E. 477 (1923).
10. For the purpose of this comment, only the rights of a donee-survivor are considered.
There has been no question of the rights of a survivor who was also the donor.
11. Salvation Army v. Hart, 239 Ind. 1, 154 N.E.2d 487 (1958); Johnson v. Johnson, 128
Ind. 93, 240 N.E. 340 (1891); Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1947).
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if the surviving joint tenant is to take the entire res, this must be
noted.
At common law, it was necessary to have the "four uni-
ties"-time, title, interest and possession-for a joint tenancy. 2
Under Indiana statutory provisions, none of the four is listed as
being necessary for a joint tenancy;'" however, Indiana courts have
held that common law requisites are necessary for the creation of a
joint account in real property under a similar statutory provision.14
Thus, in determining the rights of a surviving joint tenant of person-
alty, problems may arise when one of the joint tenants was the sole
owner of the property before the creation of the joint tenancy;' 5 this
goes to the issue of time. When the res is intangible, this goes to the
issue of possession.'6 Moreover, there is the question of unity of
interest when the donor-depositor retains control over the account,
including the power to revoke. 7 It has been suggested that in states
having the type of statute found in Indiana, the parties should not
be regarded as joint tenants, but as joint depositors." The Indiana
courts require that if the funds are deposited by one party in a joint
bank account, the other's interest must be based on a gift, trust or
contract. '"
Gift
To sustain a valid inter vivos gift in Indiana, there are five legal
requirements. These are 1) a donor competent to contract; 2) free-
dom of will; 3) completion with nothing left undone; 4) delivery by
the donor and acceptance by the donee; and 5) immediate and
absolute effect.' The delivery may be actual, constructive or sym-
bolic. 2' The signing of signature cards apparently satisfies the deliv-
12. Case v. Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395 (1894). See generally 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 418 (3rd ed. 1939).
13. IND. CODE § 34-4-4-1 (1973).
14. IND. CODE § 32-1-2-7 (1973). See Case v. Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395 (1894);
Richardson v. Richardson, 121 Ind. App. 523, 98 N.E.2d 190 (1951).
15. Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law); Estate of
Harvey v. Huler, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955); Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind.
App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1947).
16. Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law).
17. Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, at 601.
18. Id. at 602.
19. Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1947).
20. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972).
21. Crawfordsville v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 216 Ind. 596, 25 N.E.2d 626 (1940).
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ery requirement for a joint bank account.22
Trust
If the survivor relies on the trust theory, it is necessary to prove
an express trust arrangement." It may be difficult to establish an
unequivocal act manifesting an intent to create a trust, rather than
an attempted testamentary transaction. 4 It is well settled that the
trust device will not be used to perfect an imperfect gift.2"
Contract
To establish survivorship rights through the use of contract
theory, the survivor must prove the existence of a valid contract.26
With passbook accounts, the contract is between the bank, the
donor and the donee, using signature cards or other standard forms
as a memorialization of the agreement.? There is evidence that in
the jurisdictions applying contract theory, donative intent is still
the most important element in the transaction.2 8 In addition, ques-
tions may arise as to the presence of fraud, undue influence, duress
or mistake at the time the contract was made. 21 In the absence of
the above, however, there seems to be no legal obstacle to the en-
forcement of the contract.
Bank Protection Statute
Indiana has adopted a bank protection statute for the protec-
tion of banks when payment is made to the survivor of a bank
account joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Indiana Code
§ 28-1-20-1(a) provides in part:
When a deposit is made in any bank or trust company, in
the names of two persons, payable to either, or payable to
either or the survivor, such deposit, or any part thereof, or
22. Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1947).
23. First & Tri-State National Bank & Trust Co. v. Caywood, 95 Ind. App. 591, 176
N.E. 871 (1931).
24. This may be accomplished easily through the tentative or Totten trust, but few
states have recognized it and it is not recognized in Indiana. Kepner, Joint Bank Account
Muddle, at 377.
25. First & Tri-State National Bank & Trust Co. v. Caywood, 95 Ind. App. 591, 176
N.E. 871 (1931).
26. Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
27. Id.
28. Kepner, Joint Bank Account Muddle, at 389.
29. Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
1973] Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss1/7
144 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
any interest thereon may be paid to either of such persons,
whether the other be living or not, and the receipt or acquit-
ance of the person so paid shall be a valid and sufficient
release and discharge to such bank or trust company for any
payment so made.
While this statute does not raise a presumption of the validity of
such a survivorship account, it does indicate that the Indiana legis-
lature approves of such accounts. It is only by being protected in
this manner that banks would be willing to establish survivorship
joint tenancies since, given the uncertain status of such accounts,
banks could never release the funds to a donee-survivor without fear
of a successful law suit against them. It is apparent that if § 32-4-
1-1(a) concerning the creation of such interests is to have any effect
on joint bank accounts with right of survivorship, § 28-1-20-1(a) is
necessary to protect banks.
Certificates of Deposit and Third Party Beneficiaries
A certificate of deposit in Indiana is deemed to be a promissory
note."1 ' It is regarded as an absolute promise made by the bank to
pay on demand the party, parties or the survivor-if so noted-
listed on the face of the instrument.3' Indiana has recognized a
certificate of deposit as a written contract between the bank and
the depositor; 3 and, as such, it contains the only competent evi-
dence of the agreement between the parties.3 3
Indiana has long recognized that a contract may be made for
the benefit of a third party who is a stranger to the contract and the
consideration therefor .3 The rights of the third party beneficiary are
determined by the contractual intent of the parties contracting.3 5
Such intent is found in the terms of the writing and testimony
30. Lang, Ex'r v. Straus, 107 Ind. 54, 7 N.E. 763 (1886); Long v. Straus, 107 Ind. 94, 6
N.E. 123 (1886); Brown v. McElroy, 52 Ind. 404 (1876); National State Bank of Lafayette v.
Rengel, 51 Ind. 393 (1875). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104, enacted in Indiana
in 1963 as Acts 1963 c. 317 § 3-104. A certificate of deposit may, or may not, be a negotiable
instrument.
31. Brown v. McElroy, 52 Ind. 404, 408 (1876).
32. Id.
33. Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
34. Voelkel v. Tohulka, 236 Ind. 588, 141 N.E.2d 344 (1957); Freigy v. Gargaro, 223 Ind.
342, 60 N.E.2d 288 (1945); Loper v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ind. App. 84, 211 N.E.2d 797 (1965);
Blackard v. Monarch's Mfgs. & Distributors, Inc., 131 Ind. App. 514, 169 N.E.2d 735 (1960).
35. Loper v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ind. App. 84, 211 N.E.2d 797 (1965).
[Vol. 8et al.: Property Law: Requirements for Certificates of Deposit and Bank A
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
related thereto." At the creation of a contract made for the benefit
of a third party beneficiary, a legal interest arises in the third party,
and he may maintain an action to enforce that interest." It is not
necessary that the contract instrument be delivered to the third
party; 8 delivery to the promisee is sufficient." Nor does the third
party need to be aware of the promise; 0 if it is beneficial to the third
party, acceptance will be presumed.'
Since a certificate of deposit is a written contract," and Indiana
recognizes the right of a third party beneficiary to a contract,43 the
creation of a certificate of deposit by a bank and a depositor for the
benefit of a third party should create an enforceable right in the
third party. In the absence of fraud, undue influence, duress or
mistake, the right of the third party should be enforced by the court.
ZEHR V. DAYKIN
In affirming the trial court's decision in Zehr v. Daykin, the
court of appeals held that there was not a valid inter vivos gift of
the certificate. The gift theory was apparently the only theory
argued by the appellant's attorney.44 It was indicated above that in
seeking to prove a joint tenancy of personal property, three basic
theories-gift, trust or contract-are used. Because of the problems
inherent in relying on any one of them, all should be pleaded when
the facts in a case may sustain more than one theory.
As noted above, to sustain a valid inter vivos gift in Indiana,
there are five legal requirements. The court of appeals in Zehr sus-
tained the trial court's finding that since there was not a valid
delivery of the certificates, the gift failed.45 The court made no spe-
cial findings on the issues of the donor's competency to contract or
whether he acted under duress or fraud-factors affecting the valid-
36. Id.
37. Voelkel v. Tohulka, 236 Ind. 588, 141 N.E.2d 344 (1957); Freigy v. Gargaro Co., 233
Ind. 342, 60 N.E.2d 288 (1945); Blackard v. Monarch's Mfgs. & Distributors, Inc., 131 Ind.
App. 514, 169 N.E.2d 735 (1969).
38. Copeland v. Summers, 138 Ind. 219, 35 N.E. 514 (1893).
39. Id. at 223, 35 N.E. at 515.
40. Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, 8 N.E. 590 (1887).
41. Id. at 240, 8 N.E. at 592; Copeland v. Summers, 138 Ind. 219, 35 N.E. 514 (1893).
42. See cases cited note 30 supra.
43. See cases cited note 34 supra.
44. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App..... 288 N.E.2d 174, 177 (1972).
45. Id. at __, 288 N.E.2d at 177.
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ity of an inter vivos gift." As no mention is made of these factors, it
appears that either no evidence was introduced on these points
(which tends to indicate their non-existence) or if such evidence was
introduced, it did not satisfy the court.
The question, then, primarily concerns delivery of the certifi-
cates. The court stressed the lack of bank signature cards, deposit
agreements, or other writings signed by either party; the court also
stressed that the decedent-depositor retained the certificates in his
exclusive possession, and that during his lifetime all interest pay-
ments were made directly to him.47 Each of these considerations
must be analyzed to understand the court's action.
Bank Signature Cards and Other Writings
It is established law in Indiana that the delivery requirement
for a valid inter vivos gift may be satisfied by an actual, construc-
tive or symbolic delivery.48 It has been shown that signed bank
signature cards satisfy the gift requirement of delivery. 9 The chief
issue is the parties' intention when the account is created;"° when
there is the necessary intent, a gift will be found."
The lack of bank signature cards could be a significant factor
in a case involving a passbook account, where such cards are rou-
tinely used.12 However, it is the standard policy of Indiana banks not
to use such cards when creating a certificate of deposit. 3 Banking
regulations require no such cards and in fact discourage their use. 4
The standard procedure for certificates of deposit was followed in
Zehr; the bank wrote on the face of the certificate that it was to pay
Eli F. Zehr or Donald E. Zehr or the survivor. Nothing further was
required, nor was there anything further, which the bank could do
to make the agreement between itself and Eli F. Zehr more binding
according to existing regulations and practice.
The dissent stated that signing signature cards or other stan-
46. Id. at -, 288 N.E.2d at 174.
47. Id.
48. Crawfordsville v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 216 Ind. 596, 25 N.E.2d 626 (1940).
49. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
50. Id.; Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
51. Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1947).
52. Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
53. Interview with officials of the Northern Indiana Bank & Trust Co. and of the 1st
National Bank & Trust Co., Valparaiso, Indiana, October 11, 1973.
54. Id.
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dard forms "is at best an artificial distinction.""s This is especially
true when no such cards are required or even encouraged. What the
result of a lack of signature cards would be in a case involving a joint
bank account which required such cards is not at issue." The ques-
tion left by the Zehr decision is whether the court may require forms
to be completed which are not recognized by banking procedure as
being valid or necessary for the creation of an account. It leaves both
the bank and the depositor in an uncertain relationship.
The signing of bank signature cards, when required, satisfies
the requirements of a constructive delivery in Indiana.57 The Zehr
court stated that when signature cards or deposit agreements are
executed with the bank,
our courts have ignored the formal requirements for inter
vivos gifts and instead have used the contract theory and
held that signature cards, deposit agreements, or other
writings are binding contracts and constitute conclusive
proof of a gift.5'
Although the above quote indicates the court's confusion concerning
the application of either gift or contract theory to joint bank ac-
counts, it seems that the signing of signature cards by the donor and
the donee meet the delivery requirements of an inter vivos gift. In
Zehr the writing on the certificate, authorizing the bank to pay
either tenant or the survivor, should satisfy the requirements for a
constructive delivery. The certificate of deposit was a written con-
tract; at its creation Donald E. Zehr became a third-party benefici-
ary who held an enforceable right against the bank, which had made
a promise to pay him." Should the certificate of deposit not be
evidence of a written contract, it would be controlled by the follow-
ing:
"Where the evidence is sufficient to show an intention to
make a gift inter vivos of a chose in action, arising from a
debt not evidenced in writing, an unqualified direction by
the donor to the debtor to pay the debt to the donee, instead
of the creditor is a sufficient delivery of the gift, when the
55. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -, -, 288 N.E.2d 174, 177 (1972).
56. But see Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
57. Wilt v, Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law).
58. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. 288 N.E.2d 174, 177 (1972) (citations
omitted).
59. See notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text.
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debtor accepts the arrangement and agrees to carry out the
wish of the donor." [Ogdon v. Washington National Bank,
82 Ind. App. 187, 191, 145 N.E. 514, 5151 Oral direction and
acceptance of that direction are sufficient to constitute de-
livery.6 0
Thus, even if the certificate of deposit is not held to be a written
contract, Indiana law would recognize a valid delivery of the subject
matter. It would seem that the court should have determined
whether the certificate of deposit was evidence of a written contract
or of an oral promise to pay. This determination might not alter the
result, but it would clarify the position of the bank and the deposi-
tor. Regardless of whether a certificate of deposit is a written or oral
contract, it seems that creation of such certificates, for the benefit
of a third party, satisfies the delivery requirement for a gift. It
should also satisfy the requirement that the gift be complete and
nothing left undone.
Retention of Possession and Receipt of Interest Payments by Donor
The majority in Zehr relied on the absence of signature cards
in ruling against the appellant-donee. The trial court stated that the
following factors were also considered: the depositor received the
interest due on the certificates during his lifetime, and the depositor
maintained exclusive possession of the certificates in his lock box
at the bank, for which he had the only key.6 It is necessary to
determine if these facts supplied other grounds on which the trial
court's decision could have been sustained.
As to the depositor's reservation of the interest due on the cer-
tificates during his lifetime, Indiana has long recognized that the
donor of a gift can reserve the interest during his lifetime.2 It is
settled law that such a reservation will not defeat a valid gift. 3
The maintenance of possession by the depositor goes to the
question of whether both joint tenants could have had possession of
the instrument evidencing the property at the same time. It is clear
that, given the subject matter (i.e., certificates of deposit), they
could not. In a joint tenancy, possession by one joint tenant should
60. Ogle v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 501, 68 N.E.2d 550, 556 (1946) (emphasis added).
61. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App..-, -, 288 N.E.2d 174, 175 (1972).
62. Grant Trust & Savings Co. v. Tucker, 49 Ind. App. 345, 353, 96 N.E. 487, 489 (1911).
63. Id.
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be possession by all.64 The possession by one joint tenant of the only
passbook has not defeated the claim of the surviving joint tenant. 5
Since there had been a valid constructive delivery of the property
upon issuance of the certificate, the possession of the certificates
was immaterial.
The court did not mention that during the depositor's lifetime
he acted in a manner consistent with an executed gift.6 Extrinsic
evidence is admissable to demonstrate that the depositor's conduct
following the act of donation is consistent with a completed gift.67
The depositor in Zehr had not cashed the certificates, nor, appar-
ently, had he attempted to alter the certificates during his lifetime.
The first three certificates were purchased six years before the de-
positor's death, the fourth two and one-half years before his death.
The depositor's conduct during that six-year period was relevant to
whether the depositor had done anything more than reserve the
interest during his lifetime. 8 If he had acted in an inconsistent
manner, that evidence must have been presented to the trial court.
Such evidence was not presented.
Cases Cited by the Court
In reaching its decision, the majority cited nine Indiana cases.
None of the decisions cited supports the finding of the majority.
Each case is distinguishable on its facts or on the basis upon which
it was decided.
Two of the cases cited by the court, Bulen v. Pendleton Banking
Co. (joint savings account)69 and 1st & Tri-State National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Caywood (certificates of deposit),"6 were decided on the
court's finding that the donor intended the donee to receive the
money after the donor's death. In both cases, the donor had made
statements at the time the account was created that the donee was
to receive the property when the donor died.7' They were held to be
promises to make future gifts which failed for lack of consideration;
64. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
65. Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law).
66. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -_, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972).
67. Grant Trust & Savings Co. v. Tucker, 49 Ind. App. 345, 353-54, 96 N.E. 487, 490
(1911).
68. Id.
69. 118 Ind. App. 217, 78 N.E.2d 449 (1948).
70. 95 Ind. App. 591, 176 N.E. 871 (1931).
71. See cases cited notes 69 and 70 supra.
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and, therefore, they did not constitute valid inter vivos gifts.72
The question in two cases cited by the court concerned tangible
personal property which was capable of manual delivery: Zorich v.
Zorich (a box full of money; the court found no donative intent);73
and Lewis v. Burke (a house full of furniture given by a written deed
drawn up in a lawyer's office and witnessed, the letter being in the
possession of the donee)." The Indiana Supreme Court in Lewis
phrased the issue before the court as: "Is a gift by deed or other
instrument under seal of physical personal property valid in the
state of Indiana?"75 By dicta, the court refused to distinguish intan-
gible personal property, saying a writing would also be sufficient to
convey title if intangible personal property were involved without
physical delivery of the subject matter." The court went no further
and nothing was said concerning other constructive or symbolic
means for delivering intangible personal property.
One case is clearly distinguishable on its facts. Kraus v.
Kraus,77 involved postal bonds purchased by a son and daugher with
their father's money, and there was clearly no donative intent. The
court held that there had been an oral trust agreement for the bene-
fit of the father.78
Donative intent, or the lack thereof, was the basis for the deci-
sion in Ogle v. Barker.79 The Ogle decision is not an internally con-
sistent decision; the questions concerning the necessary control and
relinquishment of the corpus of a joint checking account are left in
a highly uncertain state. 0 But the court does seem to decide the case
on the question of donative intent.8 '
Finally, the last three cases on which the majority relies, Estate
72. Id.
73. 119 Ind. App. 547, 88 N.E.2d 694 (1949).
74. 248 Ind. 297, 226 N.E.2d 332 (1967).
75. Id. at 303, 226 N.E.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 235 Ind. 489, 132 N.E.2d 608 (1956).
78. Id.
79. 224 Ind. 489, 68 N.E.2d 550 (1946). The Ogle case involved both a life estate in land
and an attempted transfer by oral instruction from the husband of the right to withdraw
money in a checking account to his wife. The court held that there was no donative intent.
80. See the discussion of Ogle in Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1952) (court
applied Indiana law).
81. Ogle v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N.E.2d 550 (1946).
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of Harvey v. Huffer, 2 Clausen v. Warner3 and Wilt v. Brokaw,84 all
concerned joint bank accounts created by the use of signature cards.
They are all distinguishable from a case involving a certificate of
deposit-which is not and cannot be-created by signature cards."5
It is interesting to note that of the nine cases relied on by the
majority in Zehr, five of them (Bulen, Caywood, Zorich, Kraus and
Ogle) concentrated on the question of donative intent, a question
which the majority did not address in Zehr.
Relevant Facts Not Considered in the Court's Opinion
A number of factors have been mentioned as having relevance
in determining the rights of a surviving joint tenant in Indiana.
Among them are that the donor is not required to relinquish the
power to draw on the account,8" that acceptance of a beneficial gift
is presumed, 7 that there is existence of a donative intent, that
there is a close family relationship (a factor related to the determi-
nation of donative intent)89 and that there is an unequivocal expres-
sion of intent on the part of the depositor.90 These factors go towards
showing the existence and manifestation of donative intent. Such
intent is obviously at issue when a case is being tried on the gift
theory. None of these factors was mentioned in the majority opinion
in Zehr.
The donor in this case did instruct the bank to issue the certifi-
cate in his name and in the name of Donald Zehr, or the survivor."
There was no evidence that the donor did not understand the in-
struction he was giving to the bank. Since the corpus belonged to
the donor, he must have had a purpose for giving the instruction,
as this instruction was not necessary for the creation of the certifi-
cates. If the instruction were merely for the convenience of the donor
(to enable someone else to withdraw the funds), then the survivor-
82. 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
83. 118 Ind. App. 340, 78 N.E.2d 551 (1948).
84. 196 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law).
85. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
86. Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law).
87. Grant Savings & Trust Co. v. Tucker, 49 Ind. App. 345, 353-54, 96 N.E. 487, 490
(1911).
88. Ogle v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N.E.2d 550 (1946).
89. Wilt v. Brokaw, 96 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1952) (court applied Indiana law).
90. Hibbard v. Hibbard, 118 Ind. App. 292, 73 N.E.2d 181 (1947).
91. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972).
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ship clause was not necessary. The donor was not changing the title
to existing certificates, but purchasing them, and there was no evi-
dence that he intended to transfer an interest to the donee at any
time but the time of purchase.2
The court did not specify what relationship existed between Eli
F. Zehr and Donald E. Zehr. However, they share a common sur-
name; Donald E. Zehr was named co-executor of Eli F. Zehr's es-
tate, and the court indicated that Donald E. Zehr was a beneficiary
under the will of Eli F. Zehr.13 Since family relationship is a relevant
fact, it should have been considered by the court in assessing dona-
tive intent. Consideration of the factors relevant to donative intent
might have aided the court in deciding the case.
Questions Left Open
The majority in Zehr failed to answer certain basic questions
vital to a decision of the case. What kind of constructive delivery of
a joint bank account is necessary when signature cards are not used
in establishing the account? Is possession of the evidence of a joint
bank account by all the joint tenants necessary when such evidence
is incapable of possession by more than one joint tenant at a time?
Is it necessary to prove donative intent when seeking to claim a
survivorship joint bank account? Is a certificate of deposit a con-
tract-written or oral-in Indiana? Does a contract satisfy the gift
requirement of delivery? Does reservation of the interest during the
donor's lifetime defeat a valid gift? Is possession by one joint tenant
of the instrument memorializing the joint tenancy possession by all
the joint tenants? Since the court did not address itself to these
threshold questions, it is difficult to understand exactly what must
be done to make a valid inter vivos gift of a certificate of deposit in
Indiana at the present time.
Contract Theory
It has been noted that counsel for the appellant apparently
proceeded only on the inter vivos gift theory. 4 The majority held
that since there were no signature cards, deposit agreements or
other writings signed by either party, the trial court was correct in
92. Id.
93. Id. at -, 288 N.E.2d at 176.
94. Id.
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relying on the inter vivos gift theory to resolve the issue."5 The court
implied that in a case concerning a joint bank account, signature
cards are necessary for a binding contract." The court ignored that
Indiana has long recognized a certificate of deposit as a written
contract."' The court, as a result, also ignored the issue of the
donee's standing as a third party beneficiary.
It seems clear that in light of the decisions in Indiana concern-
ing the rights of a third party beneficiary on a contract,9" the donee
in Zehr had an enforceable right. The donor-promisee clearly indi-
cated an intent to benefit the donee,0 9and such an intent was mani-
fested on the face of the certificate.' 0 It was not necessary for the
instrument memorializing the contract to be delivered to the
donee,'"' nor was it necessary for the donee to have knowledge of the
contract.'0 As the right arising in the donee was beneficial, his
acceptance is presumed. 0
While a contract may serve to fulfill the requirement for the
delivery of a gift,' 4 as the Zehr court noted,' 5 it should be possible
to rely on the contract theory alone in deciding a case concerning a
joint bank account with right of survivorship. When the survivor-
ship account is in the form of a certificate of deposit (rather than a
passbook account for example) contract law provides a more appro-
priate theory. The Zehr court, by refusing to recognize the nature
of a certificate of deposit as a contract, has opened the door to a
great number of problems concerning an instrument widely used in
commercial transactions as well as by the private investor.
Difficulty in Appplying the Relevant Statute: Reconciliation of In-
diana Case Law
The court in Zehr never mentions the Indiana statute concern-
ing joint tenancy in personal property with right of survivorship, nor
95. Id. at - 288 N.E.2d at 177.
96. Id.
97. See cases cited note 30 supra.
98. See cases cited note 34 supra.
99. Loper v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ind. App. 84, 211 N.E.2d 797 (1965).
100. Id.
101. Copeland v. Summers, 138 Ind. 219, 35 N.E. 514 (1893).
102. Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, 8 N.E. 590 (1887).
103. See cases cited notes 40 and 41 supra.
104. Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N.E.2d 784 (1955).
105. Zehr v. Daykin, - Ind. App. -_, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972).
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the bank protection statute. Since a joint tenancy at the common
law had attributes which are not enforced in cases involving joint
bank accounts,"'" perhaps some of the confusion in Zehr concerning
the nature of a joint tenancy bank account, or what constitutes a
valid inter vivos gift of such an account, could be resolved if the
wording of the statutes did not encourage the use of the term
"joint tenants" on such an account.' 7 As has been noted above, this
confusion is magnified when only one person has contributed to the
account. ,'l
Although the court in Zehr does not discuss the theories of joint
tenancy, either at common law or by statutory enactment, possibly
the attributes of traditional joint tenancy were factors in the deci-
sion; this is manifested in confusing the lifetime rights of the donee
and his survivorship interest,'09 illustrated by the majority's reliance
on Clausen v. Warner." Clausen dealt with an attempt at an inter
vivos divestment of a joint tenant's interest in a joint bank account
without the knowledge of the other joint tenant.
If a survivorship bank account were viewed in terms of the
depositor's intention in making a contract or gift-for the transfer
of personal property-to himself and another as joint depositors, it
would be easier to assess the situation in a particular case. There
would be no need then to consider the common law requisites of
time, title, possession and interest. This appears to be the position
taken by the dissenting judge in Zehr."' This area could properly
be considered by the legislature, as well as by the courts.
CONCLUSION
An established practice on which people rely should not be held
invalid by the courts in the absence of compelling reasons to do so.
The way in which a certificate of deposit is created in Indiana is well
established. It is a practice relied on by bankers and the public.
Unless it is to be the considered policy of the Indiana courts to
106. See notes 11-19 supra and accompanying text.
107. See generally Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account.
108. See case cited note 19 supra and accompanying text.
109. Zehr v. Daykin, Ind. App. -, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972). The findings that prior
to the time of purchase the corpus was the property of the donor and that the donor retained
possession of the interest due indicate a concern with common law unities of time, possession
and interest.
110. 118 Ind. App. 340, 78 N.E.2d 551 (1948).
111. Zehr v. Daykin, __ Ind. App. -_, 288 N.E.2d 174 (1972).
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disregard the intent of a person who chooses to transfer his property
through this device, it is necessary for the courts to establish in what
way the statute passed by the legislature authorizing such joint
tenancy with right of survivorship shall be enforced. It is clear that
at the present time there is no established rule to aid the trial courts
in their decisions.
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